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WORKING PAPER

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Objectives

1. Maintain our absolute freedom of action unilaterally to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations.
2. Prevent foreign political and physical interference with the conduct of these operations.
3. Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of the operations or end products of the US satellite reconnaissance program.
4. Avoid situations, statements or actions which, in the context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be exploited as evidence either of alleged US aggressiveness or duplicity.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

1. US interest in and development of reconnaissance satellites has been officially and publicly established; some of the programs have been identified and described by official US sources.
2. Intelligence estimates of Soviet knowledge of the US program have been made. There is general agreement on the following conclusions: (SNIE 11-13-61 - Nov. 1961)

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Since the writing of this statement in November 1961, considerably more information bearing on Soviet knowledge has come to hand. It re-enforces the conclusions drawn at that time and would permit a more detailed statement of Soviet knowledge to be made.

3. No recent agreed national intelligence estimate on Soviet capabilities for applying anti-satellite measures exists. There is general agreement, however, that the USSR has a requirement for an anti-satellite system and is probably conducting research and development on a high priority basis.

4. The Soviets have the capability now to apply such passive counter-measures as camouflage. While we have detected none to date, we believe they have considered the possibility and will apply those that appear to them feasible.

5. The US has already accepted a number of formal international commitments that will affect in various ways our satellite reconnaissance programs. These commitments can be broken down into those from which we cannot withdraw under present circumstances without serious damage to our foreign policy objectives, or posture, and those from which withdrawal could probably be effected although with varying degrees of awkwardness or embarrassment.

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One of the most important of the first group is the UNGA Resolution, on the peaceful uses of outer space, unanimously adopted on 20 December 1961, which among other things led to the UN satellite registry program.

Disarmament proposals, whose inspection provisions could also affect, and be affected by satellite reconnaissance have not yet involved any actual commitments, but must, of course, continue to be considered in this respect. These provisions do include proposals concerning outer space.

In the second group, the current bilateral Soviet-US negotiations on outer-space cooperation, bilateral arrangements in effect or under consideration with our allies, and the Geneva conference on cooperation in outer-space all could affect the reconnaissance program.

Finally, although they do not have the force of international agreements, official US policy statements must be considered. The President, the Secretary of State, and other high US officials have from time to time dealt with outer space matters in public speeches and statements. Taken as a whole, these statements have tended to establish publicly broad US policy objectives on outer space matters, and to some degree to describe the manner in which they will be reached. The US official position on communications satellites, for example, has been

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has been explicitly developed in this way, although the US has not yet committed itself to specific international agreements in this field. Among the most important statements of this kind would be:

- a) The President's State of the Union message, 30 January 1961
- b) The White House statement on Communication Satellite Policy, 24 July 1961
- c) The President's address to the UN General Assembly, 25 September 1961
- d) Secretary Rusk's speech in Seattle, 25 May 1962,

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Recommendations

If the objectives set forth meet with approval, the following procedure is suggested for dealing with the facts bearing on the problem:

1. DOD assemble the evidence on point one, with a view to establishing what is and is not a matter of public record.
2. DOD, State and CIA re-examine the question of Soviet knowledge of our satellite program and, if necessary, refine and update such agreed estimates as already exist. (Mr. Brown)
3. DOD, State and CIA examine the question of Soviet anti-satellite capabilities and, if necessary, in advance of the planned National Estimate, to update the conclusions of the current National Estimate on the subject. (Mr. Scoville)
4. DOD, State and CIA to provide a short paper on Soviet capabilities in the field of passive countermeasures and probable effects on the US program of feasible Soviet actions. (Mr. Scoville)
5. State, NASA and ACDA to identify existing US commitments and proposals that will affect or be affected by the US satellite reconnaissance program and proposals and issues the US may reasonable expect in the future to require policy decisions which may affect or be affected by our reconnaissance program. (Mr. Gathoff)

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